ICES Experimental Economics Brown Bag Lecture
Credible Punishment in a Public Goods Game
Thursday, October 17, 2024 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EDT
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), Room 5075
The Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES) presents an ICES Brown Bag Lecture featuring:
George Mason University
Credible Punishment in a Public Goods Game
Abstract
We investigate how a credible commitment to punish affects efficiency and contributions in a public goods game. We analyze a game with credible punishment: players pre-commit punishment before public good contributions then dole out pre-committed punishment. This contrasts with the established public goods games literature that studies reactive peer punishment. We categorize the credible punishment game as a public goods game with a 2nd order threshold public good. A Nash equilibrium with full 1st order public good contributions supported by 2nd order public good contributions exists. This Nash equilibrium has higher contributions and higher efficiency than the Nash equilibrium in a public goods game with reactive punishment. We propose an experimental design to test these predictions.
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