ICES Experimental Economics Brown Bag Lecture

Match Stability with a Costly and Flexible Number of Positions

Wednesday, February 14, 2024 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), Room 5075

ICES Experimental Economics Brown Bag Lecture

The Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES) presents an ICES Brown Bag Lecture featuring:

David Porter

Chapman University

Match Stability with a Costly and Flexible Number of Positions

 

 

 

Abstract

One of the primary objectives of two-sided matching systems is to facilitate the pairing of two groups of agents in a manner that eliminates any incentive for pair deviation. Such challenges are prevalent and can have significant and long-lasting ramifications for participants, including students applying to colleges. While much of the existing research in this field addresses the problem using fixed quotas, real-world applications, like college admissions, demonstrate that this is not always applicable. We introduce the concept of slot stability, recognizing the potential motivation for organizations to modify their quotas after the matching process. We propose two algorithms designed to create stable and slot-stable matches by employing flexible, endogenous quotas to address this issue.

 

For more information about the Brown Bag Lectures, please visit the Brown Bag Schedule homepage.

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