Thursday, November 11, 2021 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Online Location, Zoom Meeting
The Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES) presents an ICES Brown Bag Lecture featuring:
George Mason University
Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design: Experimental Evidence
Please contact ICES Office Manager (firstname.lastname@example.org) for Zoom link.
Is past information useful if future is unpredictable? Regarding revenue guarantee, the answer is yes. The "Non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism" (Mirrokni et al., 2020) can achieve at least a constant proportion of optimal dynamic revenue without utilizing knowledge about future. When buyer's valuation in the future has high variability, the non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism outperforms the repeated optimal static mechanisms. We propose an experiment design to test the performance of the non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism in the two-period game. Experimental results support the theoretical predictions. We also find that incentive compatibility and single period individual rationality matter in the performance of non-clairvoyant mechanism.
For more information about the Brown Bag Lectures, please visit the Brown Bag Schedule homepage.