ICES Experimental Economics Brown Bag Lecture

Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design: Experimental Evidence

Thursday, November 11, 2021 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Online Location, Zoom Meeting

ICES Experimental Economics Brown Bag Lecture

The Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES) presents an ICES Brown Bag Lecture featuring:

Shan Gui

George Mason University

Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design: Experimental Evidence

 

Please contact ICES Office Manager (sbahabib@gmu.edu) for Zoom link.

 

Abstract

Is past information useful if future is unpredictable? Regarding revenue guarantee, the answer is yes. The "Non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism" (Mirrokni et al., 2020) can achieve at least a constant proportion of optimal dynamic revenue without utilizing knowledge about future. When buyer's valuation in the future has high variability, the non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism outperforms the repeated optimal static mechanisms. We propose an experiment design to test the performance of the non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism in the two-period game. Experimental results support the theoretical predictions. We also find that incentive compatibility and single period individual rationality matter in the performance of non-clairvoyant mechanism.

 

For more information about the Brown Bag Lectures, please visit the Brown Bag Schedule homepage.

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