ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory
Public Goods or Productive Clubs? Rethinking the VCM and Its Real-world Analogs
Friday, October 16, 2026 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EDT
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5075 (ICES Classroom)
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Fall 2026 semester will feature:
Chapman University
Public Goods or Productive Clubs? Rethinking the VCM and Its Real-world Analogs
Abstract
The additive linear VCM embeds the payoff structure of a large-scale public good within the social structure of a small productive group. But in the real world, small productive groups exist precisely because the inputs of individuals interact in ways that are neither linear nor additive but rather complementary. Members of work groups, study groups, religious congregations, social clubs, military units, gangs, fraternities, and families typically find that their own inputs yield more personal benefits when other members increase their inputs. Insofar as subjects carry their small-group experiences or impulses into VCM experiments, they deviate from payoff-maximizing behavior in predictable ways. A maximizing model of neoclassical group production can account for many of the outcomes observed in public goods experiments – regularities typically attributed to numerous different moral, emotional, and social-psychological motives.
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
