ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory
Discrimination by Presumption: The Risk of Assuming Gender Bias when There is None
Friday, February 13, 2026 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5183
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Spring 2026 semester will feature:
University of Wyoming
Discrimination by Presumption: The Risk of Assuming Gender Bias when There is None
Abstract
It is evident that women as a group suffer when biases against them exist. But what are the consequences of gender biases being presumed in a context when they do not actually exist? In our experiment, employers hire experts who sell advice to customers. While we find no evidence that employers themselves exhibit gender bias, employers believe that their customers prefer advice from male experts over advice from equally qualified female experts. As a result of this presumed gender bias among customers, employers favor hiring men. However, employers in our experiment hold incorrect beliefs: we find no evidence that customers actually value advice from male and female experts differently. To further isolate the mechanism underlying employers’ disproportionate hiring of male experts, we conduct a follow-up experiment in which employers receive accurate information about customer preferences. We find that when employers’ beliefs about customer gender bias are corrected, their favoritism toward male experts disappears. Our results show that presuming, or exaggerating, the existence of gender bias may itself contribute to unequal outcome.
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
