ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory
Liability by Lottery: Empirical Evidence
Friday, February 6, 2026 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5183
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Spring 2026 semester will feature:
Appalachian State University
Liability by Lottery: Empirical Evidence
Abstract
Our article offers a unique contribution to the study of group liability by examining how deliberately-designed legal uncertainty can deter collective wrongdoing. Traditional liability rules often break down in cases involving multiple injurers, such as polluting factories, surgical teams, and group violence. This article proposes and empirically tests several novel liability regimes tailored to address these challenges. In these regimes—reflecting real-world conditions—liability and damages are deliberately made uncertain. Drawing on a large-scale incentivized laboratory study involving over 400 participants, we identify a clear pattern: legal regimes that incorporate external uncertainty—such as randomly selecting one party to compensate the victim or randomizing fault apportionment—substantially reduce individuals’ willingness to engage in harmful group behavior.
Our findings highlight three key takeaways for law and policy. First, liability regimes that harness external uncertainty not only deter group harms more effectively, but are also easier to administer and may mitigate risks of discriminatory enforcement. Second, although randomized liability might appear morally troubling, participants perceived these regimes as equally fair compared to conventional approaches. Third, our study broadens the debate on deterrence in group torts and the allocation of responsibility. It offers a novel empirical and theoretical framework for reforming liability systems across tort law, employment discrimination, environmental regulation, corporate accountability, and other areas where multiple actors contribute to collective harm. By demonstrating that randomness can promote both fairness and deterrence, the article provides policymakers and scholars with a promising tool to address systemic harms where conventional liability mechanisms fall short.
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
