ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory
The Invisible Hand of Politics
Friday, January 23, 2026 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5183
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Spring 2026 semester will feature:
Brigham Young University
The Invisible Hand of Politics
Abstract
This paper models the entire political process in reduced form, as a generalized tug of war between citizens of many competing interests. Political competition roots out inefficient policies, just as market competition roots out inefficient production or distribution of goods. However, policy efficiency comes inefficiently, as efforts to pull policy in opposite directions cancel and are wasted. In fact, technologies that make political involvement easier can reduce welfare. This model gives insights into policy compromise, gridlock, extremism, policy resilience, and inequity, with application to democracy, non-democratic governments, organizations and committees, bargaining, marketing, temptation, and decision fatigue. The paper also has pedagogical value, as principles that operate elsewhere in existing literature can be seen here more simply, clearly, and generally, with close parallels to the analysis of markets.
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
