ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory
Merit and Job Allocation
Friday, November 14, 2025 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5183
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Fall 2025 semester will feature:
University of Arkansas
Merit and Job Allocation
Abstract
How are workers assigned to jobs when they differ in job-specific skills? Using a simple theoretical framework and online experiments, we examine how a social planner chooses between different worker–job assignments. In particular, we investigate the weight social planners place on meritocratic principles based on a notion of desert --- the idea that more skilled workers deserve their preferred jobs or should receive opportunities to earn more than their less skilled counterparts. Adhering to such desert-based principles can, however, conflict with other distributional objectives, such as reducing income inequality across workers or maximizing total output. Our study investigates the prevalence of such desert-based preferences and how social planners trade off competing objectives.
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
