ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory
Signaling by Harming: Experimental Analysis
Friday, September 5, 2025 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EDT
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5183
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Fall 2025 semester will feature:
Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University
Signaling by Harming: Experimental Analysis
Abstract
This Article is the first to empirically test whether tort law facilitates collusion by providing a coordination mechanism to injurers. It focuses on cases where actors will not engage in a collusive and harmful (e.g., pollutive) activity unless a minimum number of actors precommit to do the same. In high transaction cost settings, such as when cooperation is impossible or illegal, these actors must overcome a number of hurdles. First, they must be able to credibly indicate their willingness to engage in the tortious behavior in the hope that others will consider joining them. Second, they must be able to determine if a large enough number of actors are in fact interested in the tortious activity. Finally, these actors must credibly precommit to do so. We theorize and, using an innovative experimental design, empirically test the claim that tort law allows actors to credibly signal their interest and precommit to engage in collusive activities.
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
