ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory
An Individual-Based Theory of Group Voting and Electoral Turnout
Friday, January 24, 2025 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5075 (ICES Classroom)
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Spring 2025 semester will feature:
Georgetown University
An Individual-Based Theory of Group Voting and Electoral Turnout
Abstract
Voting is central to the functioning of a democracy, yet there is no consensus on how to model voters. Our limited understanding of voter behavior weakens the core foundations of political economy models. This paper introduces a novel group-based voting model that integrates expressive and ethical voter motives. Our key innovation is that voting coalitions form endogenously: Voters join coalitions when they perceive that the coalition would benefit them, motivated by a desire to avoid letting down fellow members, while retaining the autonomy to abstain from coalitions they find unappealing. The model's predictions align with empirical regularities about real world turnout, recognizing the importance of factors such as election closeness, stakes, and voting costs, as well as phenomena like underdog and bandwagon effects. Importantly, the model's tractability facilitates embedding it in other Political Economy models such as the Downs-Wittman model of spatial politics. This integration yields new insights, including that higher voting costs decrease polarization if voters have primarily instrumental concerns, while the reverse is true for expressive voters.
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
