ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory
Prosociality Declines After a Collective Ritual: Patron Saint Festivals in Oaxaca, Mexico
Friday, February 21, 2025 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5183
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Spring 2025 semester will feature:
Harvard University
Prosociality Declines After a Collective Ritual: Patron Saint Festivals in Oaxaca, Mexico
Abstract
The cross-cultural ubiquity of costly collective rituals presents a puzzle. Researchers have proposed that collective rituals enhance group solidarity, facilitating these rituals’ spread through intergroup competition. Accordingly, studies indicate that collective rituals can foster cohesion and cooperation in lab and real-world settings. We test this hypothesis in a novel, naturalistic setting: patron saint festivals (fiestas) in indigenous communities of Oaxaca, Mexico. In this preregistered natural experiment, we use mixed methods to study changes in cohesion, prosocial attitudes, and cooperation after a fiesta in one Zapotec village. Our within-subjects design included 36 participants. Contrary to prior research, we find declines in altruism and cooperation, and no change in cohesion. Nonetheless, the fiesta is a huge cooperative endeavor. While the sample is constrained by the size of the community and this naturalistic event does not offer a fully controlled field experiment, these results offer important nuance to our understanding of collective ritual.
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