ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory
Citizen Monitoring and Bureaucratic Output: Evidence from the Bureau of Indian Affairs
Friday, May 5, 2023 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EDT
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5183
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Spring 2023 semester will feature:
George Mason University
Citizen Monitoring and Bureaucratic Output: Evidence from the Bureau of Indian Affairs
Abstract
We model and test the effects of citizen monitoring of services provided by bureaucrats. Monitoring by citizens is a public good. Because of collective action problems, monitoring is underprovided, allowing bureaucrats to reduce efforts in providing services. Our model shows that collective action problems in monitoring activities are associated with sub-optimal bureaucratic output. The model predicts that the efficiency of bureaucratic output decreases with the number of citizens affected and the distribution of the bureaucracy-generated benefit. Utilizing income data from leases under the purview of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), we find broad support for our hypothesis that bureaucratic output is inversely related to the collective action challenges of bureaucrats’ clients. These collective action problems vary with the number of owners, interests of the largest shareholder, and variations in monitoring costs due to private vs. institutional ownership.
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
