ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory

Revealed Incomplete Preferences

Friday, September 2, 2022 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EDT
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5183

ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory

The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Fall 2022 semester will feature:

Kirby Nielsen

California Institute of Technology

Revealed Incomplete Preferences

 

 

Abstract

We elicit incomplete preferences over monetary gambles with subjective uncertainty. Subjects rank gambles, and these rankings are used to estimate preferences; payments are based on estimated preferences. About 40% of subjects express incompleteness, but they do so infrequently. Incompleteness is similar for individuals with precise and imprecise beliefs, and in an environment with objective uncertainty, suggesting that it results from imprecise tastes more than imprecise beliefs. When we force subjects to choose, we observe more inconsistencies and preference reversals. Evidence suggests there is incompleteness that is indirectly revealed—in up to 97% of subjects—in addition to what we directly measure.

 

For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.

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