Friday, September 30, 2022 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EDT
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5183
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Fall 2022 semester will feature:
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science at George Mason University
We propose a model of political career incentives and corruption, and take it to the lab. As predicted by the model, moral incentives and the desire for reelection interact to refrain politicians from taking bribes in the early stage of their careers. Treatments with weaker reelection incentives do worse in terms of inducing good initial behavior of politicians, but may do better in terms of inducing good behavior at a later stage. The probability of voters’ mistakes and, possibly, the distribution of moral motivations seem to vary with the treatment, with strategic behavior being apparently more common in environments with perfect information about politicians' actions..
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.