ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory

Gender, Beliefs, and Coordination with Externalities

Friday, April 29, 2022 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EDT
Online Location, Zoom Meeting

ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory

The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Spring 2022 semester will feature:

Tim Cason

Purdue University

Gender, Beliefs, and Coordination with Externalities

 

Please contact ICES Office Manager (sbahabib@gmu.edu) for Zoom link.

 

Abstract

Groups such as committees or boards make many important decisions within organizations. Many of these decisions affect external parties. This paper uses an experimental approach to study how the gender composition of three-person groups affects choices and beliefs in a Coordination game with selfish and prosocial equilibria. We find that the social preferences of group members are a key determinant of the group’s coordination choice. Controlling for social preferences of the group, groups with more women are more likely to make choices that are kinder to external parties. Both men and women believe that women will make kinder choices more frequently. Men are expected to be 9 to 18 percentage points less kind than women overall, and in uniform gender groups. These results have implications for public policies intended to increase gender diversity and women’s representation on decision-making committees in the corporate sector, in politics, and in academia.

 

For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.

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