Friday, March 4, 2022 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Online Location, Zoom Meeting
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Spring 2022 semester will feature:
University of Alabama
Experimental Evidence on the Role of Outside Obligations in Wage Negotiations
Please contact ICES Office Manager (sbahabib@gmu.edu) for Zoom link.
Abstract
We examine how sharing information about outside obligations impacts wage negotiations. Consider an ‘employee’ with an outside obligation, whose performance determines the surplus, and an ‘employer’ with power-to-give, who decides the employee’s wage. We find that wage offers increase with obligation amounts, when latter are known. However, employer simply redistributes surplus from employees with no obligations to those with higher obligations, at no additional cost to self. We find no evidence of gender bias in wage offers. Our experiment provides explanation for some of the gender wage gap, and shows how seemingly equitable policies may still perpetuate inequity among employees.
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
