ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory

Experimental Evidence on the Role of Outside Obligations in Wage Negotiations

Friday, March 4, 2022 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EST
Online Location, Zoom Meeting

ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory

The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Spring 2022 semester will feature:

Laura Razzolini

University of Alabama

Experimental Evidence on the Role of Outside Obligations in Wage Negotiations

 

Please contact ICES Office Manager (sbahabib@gmu.edu) for Zoom link.

 

Abstract

We examine how sharing information about outside obligations impacts wage negotiations. Consider an ‘employee’ with an outside obligation, whose performance determines the surplus, and an ‘employer’ with power-to-give, who decides the employee’s wage. We find that wage offers increase with obligation amounts, when latter are known. However, employer simply redistributes surplus from employees with no obligations to those with higher obligations, at no additional cost to self. We find no evidence of gender bias in wage offers. Our experiment provides explanation for some of the gender wage gap, and shows how seemingly equitable policies may still perpetuate inequity among employees.

 

For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.

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