ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory

Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An Experiment.

Friday, September 17, 2021 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM
Online Location, Zoom Meeting

ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory

The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Fall 2021 semester will feature:

Alessandra Casella

Columbia University

Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An Experiment.

 

Please contact ICES Office Manager (sbahabib@gmu.edu) for Zoom link.

 

Abstract

Under majoritarian election systems, securing participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is Cumulative Voting (CV): each voter has as many votes as open positions and can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Theory predicts that CV encourages the minority to overcome obstacles to voting: although each voter is treated equally, CV increases minority’s turnout relative to the majority, and the minority’s share of seats won. A lab experiment based on a costly voting design strongly supports both predictions.

 

For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.

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