ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory

Salary Disclosure and Hiring: Field Experimental Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit Study

Friday, September 25, 2020 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM
Zoom Meeting

The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Fall 2020 semester will feature:

Laura Gee

Tufts University

Salary Disclosure and Hiring: Field Experimental Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit Study 

 

Please contact ICES Office Manager (sbahabib@gmu.edu) for Zoom link.

 

Abstract

What is the effect of job candidates disclosing their salary history on callbacks and salary offers? If these effects differ by a job candidate's gender or the amount they disclose, then disclosure might also impact inequality in the labor market. We implement a field experimental design we call a two-sided audit study, in which recruiters evaluate job applications with randomized characteristics under randomly assigned salary disclosure conditions. We begin by estimating the effects of candidates' salary disclosure on outcomes such as callbacks and salary offers. Then, we combine our estimates to examine the likely effect of recent laws that ban employers from asking candidates for their salary history like those passed in Massachusetts, California, New York City, and Chicago on wage inequality.

 

For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.