ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory: Prior’s Rule: When Do Malfeasance Revelations Help or Hurt Incumbent Parties? (Pablo Querubin, New York University)
Past Event
Friday, April 27, 2018 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM EDT
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), #5183
The next ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the semester will feature:
New York University
Prior’s Rule: When Do Malfeasance Revelations Help or Hurt Incumbent Parties?
4:00 - 5:00 PM
Friday, April 27th
5th Floor, Room 5183, Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), Arlington Campus
For more information about the Seminar Series and this week's readings, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
