dynamic games, revealed preference, experimental economics
Arthur is a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the Interdisciplinary Center of Economic Science. He studies complex strategic behavior in dynamic games and markets, usually through some form of convex or integer optimization.
Currently working on identification of social preferences and reconstructing strategies in repeated games (with Mikhail Freer) and assignment markets (with Cesar Martinelli, Daniel Houser and Thomas Stratmann).
ECON 309: Economic Problems and Public Policies
2009, BA in Economics, Moscow State University, Moscow (Russia)
2011, MA in Economics, Moscow State University, Moscow (Russia)
May 2020 (Expected), PhD in Economics, ICES, George Mason University, Fairfax (VA)
Assignment Markets: Theory and Experiments. The Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications. Lisbon (Portugal). 2019.
Mechanism Design with Memory and no Money. Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory. Stony Brook (NY). 2019.
Revealed Social Preferences. North American Summer Meeting of Econometric Society. Davis (CA). 2019.
Revealed Social Preferences. Foundations of Utility and Risk Conference (FUR). York (UK). 2018.