ICES Brown Bag for March 22

Events, Seminars | March 20, 2018

Join us for the next ICES Brown Bag Lecture of the semester, featuring Daniela Puzzello.

Prof. Puzzello, of the University of Indiana, Bloomington, will discuss her paper On Cooperation in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games: A Stress Test of the Basin of Attraction of Always Defect (Abstract). The talk will take place on Wednesday, March 22nd, from 2:00 to 3:00pm, in room 5075 of the Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), Arlington campus.

Coffee and dessert will be provided.

Please visit the Brown Bag Schedule to learn more about the Brown Bag series.


Situations in which there is a tension between what is individually optimal and socially optimal are common. A variety of factors may determine whether opportunistic behavior or cooperation prevails in these situations, including whether interactions are repeated. While the theory of infinitely repeated games is helpful in capturing intertemporal incentives, it often fails to provide sharp predictions. A growing experimental literature explores factors affecting cooperation in repeated 2-person social dilemma interactions and suggests that the Basin of Attraction of Always Defect (BAD) has explanatory power for both finitely and infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. In this study we examine behavior in both finitely and indefinitely repeated interactions. Building on the research presented in Lugovskyy, et al. (2017) we first examine whether BAD helps in understanding differences in behavior in PD games based on the parameters from Dal Bó (2005) and parameters based on a linear public goods game. Then we proceed to examine behavior across several game forms where we systematically vary game parameters, holding BAD constant. In summary, these “stress tests” of the predictive power of BAD suggest that behavior depends on aspects of the game that are not fully captured by this single metric.

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