ICES Brown Bag for April 21

Events, Seminars | April 14, 2016

Join us for an ICES Occasional Brown Bag Lecture, featuring Elif Ece Demiral and Weiwei Tasch.

Ms. Demiral, of George Mason University, will discuss her paper (co-authored with Daniel Houser) Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game (abstract). Ms. Tasch, also of George Mason University, will discuss her paper (co-authored with Daniel Houser)Inequality Aversion Model In Sequential Public Goods Game (abstract).

The talks will take place on Thursday, April 21st, in room 5075 of the Metropolitan Building, Arlington campus. Ms. Demiral will speak from 12:00pm to 12:30pm and Ms. Tasch will speak from 12:30pm to 1:00pm.

Coffee and dessert will be provided.

Please visit the Brown Bag Schedule to learn more about the Brown Bag series.

Demiral Abstract

Women earn less than men and hold fewer executive positions. Previous studies argue that this difference is the result of women negotiating less. In this study, we are interested in the effect of feelings of entitlement on men’s and women’s negotiation behavior in the Ultimatum Game. In the Baseline treatment of our experiment, the proposer and responder roles are randomly assigned. In the Earning treatment, the proposers earn their role based on superior performance in a math task. We hypothesize that females will react stronger to the treatment than men. As previous studies have found, overall offers become less generous when proposers earn their role. We further explain that the result is due to change in female’s behavior. When proposers earn their role, female proposers significantly lower their offers, whereas male proposers do not.

Tasch Abstract

The goal of this research is to assess the predictive power of an inequality aversion model in a conditional setting. This is achieved by running three different experiments using the same subjects in an ultimatum game, a dictator game, and a sequential public goods game. The result of this study will be not only to elicit conditional inequality aversion preference at the individual level, but to assess the effect of this on cooperative dynamics.

<<< Back to News Page