Join us for the next ICES Experimental Economics Seminar of the semester, featuring Robin Clark.
Professor Clark, of the University of Pennsylvania, will discuss his paper Language Games and the Evolution of Linguistic Norms (please see below for the abstract). The talk will take place on Friday, October 5th, from 4:00 to 5:30pm, in room 648 of the Truland Building, Arlington campus.
Visit the Seminar schedule for background readings and to learn more about upcoming speakers.
In the first part of this talk, I will illustrate how to treat linguistic ambiguities—in particular, an indirect speech act—as a game. I will focus on how to select an equilibrium given the amount of mutual information available to the speaker and the hearer. In the second part of the talk, we will turn to speech acts in a population. In particular, I will turn to deception and show how social norms can evolve that promote truthfulness, even when deception (as is often the case) may be in the interest of the speaker. Thus, although deception might seem to promote a pooling equilibrium in a signaling game, external social constraints can evolve that will maintain the separating equilibrium.